It CAN be done!

Barnaby Donohew has to stick to his guns to track down the ‘simplest’ of faults

By Barnaby Donohew | Published:  10 September, 2018

We all remember certain jobs which test our nerve but ultimately serve to strengthen our capabilities. Proper learning experiences so to speak. Unsurprisingly, these memorable jobs tend to occur when tackling novel technologies or environments which, by their nature, can be unsettling.
    
Some time ago a customer arrived with a MINI having persistent warning lights, instrumentation faults and bearing a new instrument cluster and engine control unit. Mindful that the expensive repair history must have included some seriously ‘in-depth’ diagnosis, I decided to get involved and see what I could do to fix the issues.

Ruling out
A system scan reported various powertrain CAN faults in the engine, ABS and instrument cluster control units, indicating a system-wide communication issue but with no systematic patterns to help isolate the fault. The MINI had a separate diagnostic bus, which thankfully permitted scan tool communication in the presence of a CAN fault. However, CAN access was not available on the diagnostic connector to aid recording of the signals. Instead, an oscilloscope was connected to the engine control unit (Figure 1) to reveal that the wires were unlikely to have shorted together, to Earth, nor to +5V, as the signals from the engine control unit were almost ideal. The fault was more likely due to circuit integrity. After powering down the CAN this was confirmed, as a 120 Ohm resistance was measured between the high and low lines (around 60 Ohms was expected).
    
Subsequently, the customer was called with an update and to authorise further expenditure. The next stage involved pulling the car apart to fully check the wiring and control modules. Plainly, it was unwelcome news.

Added pressures
When conscious that the meter is running, doubt can creep in and you find yourself asking if a wiring fault is too simple, alongside other related questions. This was not a good time for misinformation. The resources available (course notes and workshop information) identified the MINI’s engine control and ABS units as each having a 120 Ohm terminating resistor between the CAN pins. Subsequent measurements determined a resistance of 120 Ohms on the engine control unit but many kilohms on the ABS control unit. Was it faulty? Nerves started to fray. Following a thought process akin to James Dillon's mantra "what would you test next if the part you had just fitted did not cure the fault," basic procedures were recalled.
    
Firstly, on this MINI the terminating resistors actually were in the engine and instrument control modules (all were fine). Next, a series of continuity tests isolated an open circuit on the CAN-H line between the ABS and engine control units. It was located in a well-protected and tiny portion of wire, equidistant between the terminating connectors. Figure 2 shows the damage.
    
The process demonstrated to me how, during stressful situations, it is worth trying to adhere to basic procedures as faults are often straightforward. As it turns out, this would have been good advice for the recent Top Technician practical tasks, which proved a very similar experience – I wish I had listened! For anyone thinking of entering, I highly recommend it.

TT Archives:  Top Technician issue seven 2014 | www.toptechnician.co.uk 

Related Articles

  • Certifying your future 

    The rate at which the modern car is developing to include new functions based on new technologies is exponential.

    The car owner is often unaware of this, as they see only the ‘HMI’ (human machine interface) that allows them to select and control functions and along with many other electronically controlled ‘things’, the expectation is that ‘it just works’.

    Two key elements are changing with today’s and tomorrow’s cars. Firstly, they are changing into more sophisticated, interactive electronic systems, which require high levels of software compliance. Frequently this can mean that the vehicle needs ‘updating’ which may apply to one system or the complete vehicle. Today this is increasingly conducted by using standardised interface (vehicle communication interfaces – VCI’s) and pass through programming by establishing a direct connection between the vehicle and the vehicle manufacturer’s website. This is now being used even at the level of replacing basic components, such as a battery or engine management system components.

    Secondly, vehicles are increasingly being connected through telematics systems so that the car is becoming part of ‘the internet of things’. This allows remote communication with the vehicle to provide a range of new services to the vehicle owner, driver, or occupants. These broadly fall into two categories – consumer related services, such as internet radio stations, link to e-mails, finding the nearest free parking space and much more, or business related access to in-vehicle data to allow remote monitoring of the status of the vehicle for predictive maintenance, remote diagnostics, vehicle use, pay-as-you-drive insurance etc.

    Increasing isolation
    The in-vehicle E/E architecture is therefore not only increasingly complicated and inter-active, it is more vulnerable to incorrect repair processes. To ensure that this risk is minimised, the vehicle manufacturers are increasingly isolating any possible external connections from the in-vehicle communication buses and electronic control modules. Effectively, today’s 16 pin OBD connector will no longer be directly connected to the CAN Bus and in turn to the ECU(s) but will communicate via a secure in-vehicle gateway. There may also be a new standardised connection which becomes a local wireless connection in the workshop as well as having remote telematics connection, but in both cases, the access to in-vehicle data is no longer directly connected.
        
    Why is this isolation and protection of the in-vehicle systems so critical? Apart from the obvious protection against any malicious attack, there is an increasing safety issue. Thinking longer term, what happens when semi-autonomous cars or fully autonomous cars come into your workshop?
        
    The key question is how to conduct effective repairs on these vehicle systems. At first glance, it may be the basic servicing still needs to be done, but even this will become more difficult, with certain items already requiring electronic control or re-setting. As this develops into more sophisticated systems, the vehicle manufacturer may try and impose more control over who is doing what to ‘their’ vehicles, based on their claim that they have a lifetime responsibility of the functionality of the vehicle and therefore need to know who is doing what where and when. This may lead to an increasing requirement for independent operators to have some form of accreditation to ensure sufficient levels of technical competence before being allowed to work on a vehicle. However, there is also a strong argument in many European countries (the UK included) that this is a market forces issue and that it is the choice of the customer who they trust to repair their vehicle and it is the responsibility of the repairer to be adequately trained and equipped.

    What’s coming?
    Will this market forces attitude still continue when the autonomous vehicle systems are part of the intrinsic safety of the vehicle? This is increasingly becoming the case as these semi or fully autonomous systems take over more control of the vehicle and stop any driver control.
       
    Certainly, anyone attempting any DIY repair will find it much more difficult to access the information or the tools/equipment needed to repair their vehicle, as this will be beyond the knowledge and economic reach of the ‘Sunday morning repairer’, but should DIY repairs even be allowed in the future?

    This raises an interesting argument about who should be allowed to work on a vehicle as the correct repair procedures become increasingly critical. Of course, vehicle manufacturers will continue to have full access to the vehicle and it’s systems, which increasingly will be via remote (telematics) access. This may even compromise the access available to authorised repairers (main dealers), but is seen as a necessary requirement to ensure that the vehicle has been repaired correctly and that the in-vehicle software is still functioning correctly.

    The counter argument is that this also provides unacceptable levels of control and monitoring of the complete independent aftermarket – so what could be a solution?

    Controlling competition
    No one is trying to say that safety and security are not important, but there must be a balance as independent operators will continue to need access to diagnostic, repair, service and maintenance information and continue to offer competitive services to the consumer. The European legislator must protect competition, but this may also come with appropriate controls and this may mean that tomorrow’s technicians will need to demonstrate certain levels of competence, together with an audit trail of the work which has been performed in the event of a vehicle malfunction.

    Independent operators already need high levels of technical competence – necessary for the consumer and the effective operation of their own business, but in the future this may also mean a form of licensing or certification that is required by legislation. If this becomes necessary, then it has to be appropriate, reasonable and proportionate.

    The alternative is that the vehicle manufacturer could become the only choice to diagnose, service and repair the vehicles of tomorrow. I am sure we all agree that it is not what we want or need, so it may be that the increasing technology of tomorrow’s vehicles is the reason that the industry should now embrace change to mirror other safety related industry sectors, such as Gas Safe or NICEIC – qualified, competent and registered. The future is changing and the aftermarket needs to change with it.

    Want to know more?
    Find out how Neil’s consultancy for garage owners can benefit you by visiting xenconsultancy.com.

  • Under no pressure 

    Once the news started to spread about my Top Technician win, the phone started to ring with more interesting and challenging jobs, usually ones that have been doing the rounds between other garages without success.
      
     A phone call came from a local parts supplier, a visiting rep was having issues with a DPF. They believed it needed a simple regeneration to get it back on the road and asked if I would be able to do the job. After checking the Blue Print G-Scan, the function for a forced regeneration was available, I believed I would be able to carry it out and booked the job in.

    Basic beginnings
    After traveling from two hours away, the vehicle arrived. The customer was questioned, ‘Why do you require a DPF regen?’ Being a parts rep within the motor trade, her garage visits were frequent; various attempts had been made to resolve the issue. With conflicting advice being given and quotes between £600 - £1200 to fix the vehicle, the customer was obviously confused and unsure about what to do.
        
    The engine management light was on, so the obvious place to start was a scan check for fault codes. The vehicle showed P2002: Particulate Trap Below Threshold.
        
    Viewing the live data for the DPF pressure sensor, key on engine off, displayed a 0kpa pressure reading, a good start for a sensor plausibility check. With the engine running and RPM increased, the sensor reported a suspiciously low-pressure reading, not one I would associate with a saturated DPF. I decided to use the Pico Scope to look at the DPF pressure sensor voltage in real time. After confirming the power and ground circuits to be ok at the three wire pressure sensor, the signal wire was checked. Again key on engine off, 750mv was displayed, a sensor plausibility check and again this was good. Starting the vehicle and increasing the revs revealed exactly the opposite to what I had expected, a negative voltage reading. The voltage should increase as the exhaust pressure increases.

    What’s wrong?
    One area I wanted to check was that the pipes were not connected the wrong way around. I decided to use the Mity Vac to apply pressure to the sensor pipe connected in front of the filter. This showed a positive rise in voltage, further proving good sensor functionality and confirming the pipes to be correctly connected. Connecting the Mity Vac to the pipe after the filter and applying pressure, simulated the negative voltage which was seen when the vehicle RPM was increased, simulating the fault. The sensor pipe in front of the filter must be blocked.
        
    I located the steel pipe that is fitted in the exhaust in front of the filter to reveal soot marks, it had been leaking exhaust gasses. On a closer look it was unscrewed from the exhaust while still located in the hole due to the pipe bracket allowing the slight leak of exhaust gasses. Once the pipe was removed it was clear to see the soot had built up and blocked the small hole in the end of the pipe. I unblocked the pipe, checked to make sure the mounting hole on the exhaust was clear and refitted it.
        
    Using the Pico Scope again on the signal wire, it now showed a positive rise in voltage when the RPM was increased. The live data now showed a small pressure increase, the filter was not blocked. With all fault codes cleared, an extended road test was carried out, the pressure reading stayed low throughout and no fault codes reoccurred confirming the fix, the vehicle did not require DPF regeneration.

    With no parts required to fix the vehicle the repair cost was far lower than the customer expected due to the previous attempts. The vehicle was returned to the customer who was surprised by the
    outcome of the repair and relieved by the associated costs.



    TT Archives:  Top Technician issue nine 2016 | www.toptechnician.co.uk

  • WIN with WhoCanFixMyCar.com 

    Aftermarket readers have the opportunity to win a year’s free membership with WhoCanFixMyCar.com. That’s unlimited quoting on the site for a full 12 months, as well as 30 days free support from a dedicated account manager to help you get the best out of your membership.

  • All the things YOU could do…  

    If you had a little money, how would you spend it to improve your business? Maybe you’d buy the latest ADAS calibration kit, or subscribe to an workshop management system?

    Okay, now let’s think bigger. If you were given all the money you had ever invested in your business and could start it again from scratch, how would you gear it up to attract customers and make it profitable? Would you build something like
    your current business, or would it be totally different?

    Why do I ask? Because the world changes quickly, which means our businesses are rarely set up exactly as we need or want, and we must make frequent spending decisions. We must work out how to prioritise our spending, to ensure we always offer the things of greatest worth to our customers; i.e. we maximise our value proposition.

    Last month, we sought to understand our typical customer (a private vehicle owner). We saw that they have functional, emotional and social tasks to complete (jobs). These jobs have either good results (gains), or bad outcomes, risks and obstacles, related to their undertaking or failure (pains). For example, taking a car to the workshop is an extreme pain for a typical customer because it makes it more difficult for them to complete their more important jobs (e.g. commute to work or navigate the school run).

    This month, we’ll use the things we learned about our customers to design our value proposition; We’ll use a repeatable technique to ensure our businesses offer the things our customers need and want. The result will be a value (proposition) map, or value map for short.

    Value mapping
    Anything that helps our customers get their jobs done will have value. Therefore, our products and services must aim to help them complete their jobs. If these products and services then eliminate a customer’s pains, they are pain relievers, or, if they produce gains, they become gain creators. By stating the ways in which our products and services create gains and relieve pains, we can communicate their potential benefit to our customers. Hence, by putting a list of our products and services together with the lists of their respective pain relievers and gain creators, we create a guide to the worth of our business to our customers. That is, we make a value map.

    Of course, not all our products and services, and their subsequent pain relievers and gain creators, are equally relevant to our customers; some are essential, whilst others are merely nice to have. We can use these differences to help our decision making: by ranking the items in our value map in their order of relevance to our customer, we can see which can be ignored, and which can be prioritised.

    Figure 1 shows example items that might be within an independent workshop’s value map, ranked in order of relevance to a private-vehicle-owning customer (a value map is targeted at a specific customer segment). As with the creation of a customer profile, there is no ‘right’ answer; this one is based on my half-thought-through assumptions, and previous business experiences. Yours might differ. Hence, we must derive and tweak our respective value maps accordingly. Ultimately, each of us would use business metrics (e.g. profit ratios and customer satisfaction ratings) to tune our value propositions to the max. But that’s a task for another time.

    Products and services
    We saw before that customers don’t like to waste time at a workshop; they want to go through their lives with the minimum of hassle. They crave convenience. Therefore, courtesy cars, a handy location (covered under ‘community-orientated’ services in Figure 1), extended opening-hours, while-you-wait servicing, or pick-up and returns (either vehicle or customer) all represent high value offerings. We don’t have to offer them all - they’re included in Figure 1 for reference. Likewise, online bookings and related management systems simplify engagement, bring convenience, and enhance value.

    Have you ever heard a customer say they like messy and dirty workshops and technicians? I haven’t. That’s because we attach value to our health and safety: If your premises and staff are well presented, they will project professionalism, and your customers will reach their desired emotional state of feeling safe. Even better, properly motivated, well-equipped and trained staff will increase the likelihood that your customers are safe and secure. As safety fears are powerful motivators and manipulators, we must use our expertise to help our customers assess and manage their exposure to risks. They will then be in control and feel in control of their safety.

    Not all customers will be seeking to cut costs all the time, but certainly all of them will want to control their costs. There are ways a business can help customers manage this aspect of their lives: clear terms of trade and fee structures; well-managed engagements with expert advice; warranted parts and labour; and a range of payment methods such as easy-pay solutions, touch-less, or credit card services.

    Surprisingly, some customers want to look after their vehicles. Primarily, this helps them feel safe and secure, minimises the risk of disruption to their lives (from breakdowns), and protects the value of their vehicles. A good service history represents monetary value in this sense. This means we should be offering, high quality parts and labour, and OE-aligned servicing and repairs.

    Pain relievers
    It might suit your ego to think all your customers visit your workshop because of your skill, expertise and professionalism, or your friendly welcome and great (i.e. free) coffee. However, pure convenience can be the decisive factor when some customers choose where to take their vehicles: you’re around the corner; you had a spare courtesy car; you’re open; you were prepared to look at it there and then; you had the part in stock etc. Whilst this reflects the significant value these pain relievers offer to all our customers, it is the case that some of those who value convenience above all else are not able to see the worth of your other products and services. If they don’t understand that your conveniences come at a cost, then point them elsewhere. You will never please them. Nothing has the potential to sour a relationship like an unexpected bill: When my head was buried in an absorbing diagnostic job, adequate communication was sometimes an issue for me. My ‘solution’ was to swallow the costs, to avoid upsetting the customer. This was neither a solution nor a sustainable business strategy. What I really needed was the best preventative medicine of all: Great communication.

    It should be no surprise that there are far more pains than gains in our value map: Servicing and repair workshops are all about pain relief; we are either trying to eliminate a current pain, through diagnostics and repairs, or carrying out preventative maintenance to avoid a future pain. Because this is our reason for being, customers find it intolerable to think our actions have caused them unnecessary inconvenience or costs. Nowhere is this more obvious than when we try to ‘help them out’ -  Every time we ever tried to help a customer to control costs (i.e cut costs), by fitting a cheaper part or trying a less expensive solution, it always backfired. Every single time. Can you guess who suffered the consequences? It always paid us better to ensure the car was fixed when it left the workshop. ‘Try it and see’ tends to translate into ‘you are going to be really cheesed off next time I see you’, It also counted that we supplied quality, parts and labour.

    Gain creators
    When properly delivered, our products and services will help our customers have the following: An easy-life; a car that holds its value and works properly; peace of mind; a sense of feeling special at our premises; and the information from our sound advice to make good decisions.

    However, for some of us, the ultimate convenience is to not have to engage our brain, so if we really want to take our value proposition to the next level, we must be highly proactive and perform our customers’ thinking for them: e.g. by sending MOT and service reminders, with easy to process ‘calls to action’ so that they are only a click away from being sorted. Then, at the allocated time, we would pick-up their vehicles from their homes to take them to the workshop, leaving a replacement vehicle in their place. I know plenty of businesses that do this. And they are successful.

    Money, money, money
    There are many servicing and repair options available to private vehicles owners: Independent workshops, fast-fit chains, main-dealer workshops, mobile technicians, chancers, etc. Next time we’ll see how other business types deliberately tweak their offerings (value maps) to fit specific customer segments. We need to learn to be equally deliberate and well-informed about our investment decisions. What if we don’t? Well, we might waste all our money, and lose all our customers. Which isn’t always funny, even in a rich man’s world.


    https://automotiveanalytics.net

  • Immobilisers and (in)security 

    We need to talk about security. Why? Because deliberately or not, its effects are mutating our opportunities within the automotive aftermarket. We need to understand more about it and, at some point, to try to anticipate the eventual set of circumstances to which it might lead. As they say, forewarned is forearmed.

    We’ll begin by looking at an example of a recent security system and checking out its inner workings. We’ll review its potential vulnerabilities and assess the need for, and impacts of, increased security. First though, we’ll cover some general concepts, to keep in our minds the bigger picture regarding possible motivations for increased security.


    Security
    Security is the protection of things having value, where they might be at risk from theft or attack; i.e. when they have, or are perceived to have a vulnerability. Security aims to prevent an agent of ill-intent (e.g. criminals, intruders, missiles, or computer-viruses etc.) from gaining access. The consequence of this is the introduction of barriers to those requiring legitimate access, such as owners, occupiers, citizens or data-holders. This dichotomy is at the heart of all security implementation issues. This always begs the question; what level of security balances an intended degree of protection from risk, with the subsequent barriers to legitimate access or freedoms?

    As the assessment of risk primarily determines the necessary level of security, it is not hard to imagine that superficially legitimate security concerns can be used to justify limiting access to a favoured group. It’s a simple trick, just inflate the perceived risks and exaggerate the vulnerabilities where necessary. A similar mechanism can be used in a health and safety environment, where legitimate but undesirable behaviours in the eyes of the decision makers can be quashed by deliberate overstatement of the perceived risks. When loaded with the weight of moral absolutes (“lives are at stake”), the arguments seem powerful but are they really intended to shut-down reasoned debate regarding the actual risks? Anyway, the point is, we cannot have a reasonable discussion regarding proportionate levels of security without being able to properly assess potential vulnerabilities and associated risks.


    Immobilisation
    Vehicle immobiliser systems have been developed to protect vehicles from theft. There is a clear need for the security as the risks are very real. Car thefts were far more common prior to their development. Such systems work by only allowing vehicle mobilisation when a key, placed in the ignition switch, is from the unique set authorised to start the vehicle. The following describes a representative immobiliser system and its behaviour during ignition-on and engine-start conditions, just after the car has been unlocked. As we will be discussing potential vulnerabilities, the make and model is not given.

    Component-wise, such systems usually consist of a transponder in the key head, a transponder coil around the ignition switch and an immobilisation control system within either a dedicated immobiliser control module, or another control unit, such as the central electronics module (CEM). The CEM might be hard-wired to an immobiliser indicator in the dashboard or instrument cluster (IC), to indicate the system’s status to the user. The CEM will communicate with the engine control module (ECM) using a CAN bus. Note that, if the CEM is on the medium-speed CAN bus and the ECM on the high-speed CAN bus, then a control module that is connected to both buses, such as the IC, will need to act as a gateway to communications between the two.

    There are usually two stages to the authorisation/start process; the first, a key checking phase, is initiated when the key is placed in the ignition barrel and the second is a start-authorisation phase, instigated when the operator turns on the ignition.
    A typical key checking phase might progress as follows (see Figure 1 for the representative signals): initially the system will be in an immobilised state, indicated by periodic flashing (e.g. once every two seconds) of the immobiliser indicator. When the key is placed in the ignition switch, the CEM energises the transponder coil (e.g. at 125 kHz), which excites the transponder. The transponder responds by transmitting identification and rolling code data to the CEM via an inductive voltage within the transponder coil circuit. The CEM will check the returned data against the stored data to confirm its identity. The CEM might double-check the key identity using the same mechanism.

    The start-authorisation phase proceeds as follows: When the ignition key is turned to position II (ignition on), the ECM detects the ignition supply voltage and sends a start request CAN message to the CEM. If the key is valid, the CEM responds positively, with a code derived from the message contents sent by the ECM. In return, the ECM replies to confirm that the vehicle is in a mobilised state and that it can crank and run the engine. Upon receipt of this confirmation message, the CEM can illuminate the immobiliser indicator (e.g. with a one second confirmation flash) and then turn it off. If the key is invalid, the CEM will respond negatively to the ECM’s start request message, such that the ECM will not crank or start the engine, and the alarm indicator will continue to indicate an immobilised state.


    Insecurity
    The immobiliser’s subsystems could be vulnerable to several types of attack: Key recognition; The key recognition subsystem, consisting of the CEM, transponder coil or and transponder, could be prone to attack if the correct rolling codes could be transmitted in the right way and at the right time. Note that to move the vehicle, the correct mechanical key would need to be in place to remove steering locks etc. Key-less start systems present other sequencing issues (related to direct CAN messaging, described below), which would need to be co-ordinated with the press of the engine start button etc. The biggest vulnerability and simplest way to attack the system is to clone an authorised key.

    Direct access to the CAN bus; If the start-request from the ECM and subsequent immobiliser related messages can be intercepted and the appropriate (algorithmically generated) response codes returned, then the CAN communication system could be used to carry out unauthorised mobilisation of a vehicle. The method would rely on a controllable communication device having a physical connection with the CAN bus. Timing is important (the messages are often expected to be received within a certain time frame) and the genuine responses that would be sent out by the immobiliser controller would need to be mitigated against (e.g. the filtering out of its likely negative response to a start request, that might cause the ECM to immobilise itself).

    Aside from the practical connectivity and the sequencing issues, there is the issue of knowing how to generate the correct response codes to a start request. Although, the codes are observable in an unencrypted network, the relationship between the in and out codes can be extremely difficult to calculate using analytic methods alone and are more likely to be determined from reverse engineering of the control unit’s program files. Aside from the legal implications, the challenge is still great, which is very likely why it has not appeared to have happened.

    Indirect access to the CAN bus; Given the potential difficulties of physically placing a communication device on the CAN bus, an alternative approach is to hijack a device that is already connected. Any internal (software or hardware) system within a connected control module that has access to the controller’s CAN interface might provide a channel through which unauthorised access could be attempted (especially if a vehicle manufacturer has already built-in a remote starting capability).

    It is this type of attack that has been highlighted as a particular concern with the advent of connected vehicles, purportedly presenting hackers with opportunity to remotely control some or all of a vehicle’s functionality. There have been notably few examples of vehicles being hacked in this way and it will be very interesting to see if that changes over the coming years.
    All in all, the challenges needing to be overcome to take advantage of any the three perceived vulnerabilities and to steal a car are great. Quite simply the easiest form of attack is to clone a key. The question is then, what are the motivations for ill-intentioned agents to attack our automobiles and are they likely to want to try to steal a car through attacking the immobiliser system? I’m not sure I’m qualified to answer that.


    Information
    There is a further, related, development that has already dawned within our automotive landscape. Our modern motor vehicles are capable of generating significant volumes of personal data regarding much of our travel and lifestyle habits. This information is hugely valuable. Google’s company worth is colossal and their value is driven purely by their knowledge of our online browsing habits (through the use of their web applications). For the most part, we are not always online. Imagine though, if they could collect a raw feed of data regarding our offline habits, such as those we might create when we travel within our vehicles. How much would the company that had access to that data be worth? With that thought, it is clear why tech firms are falling over themselves to tap into our automotive existences.

    Given that all this valuable data is flying around unencrypted vehicle communication networks (much of it is required by engine, navigation, entertainment and ADAS systems etc.), why in their right minds, would the vehicle manufacturers not want to encrypt that data and keep it to themselves? By doing so they would be able to prevent any third parties, including (coincidentally) aftermarket diagnostic tool manufacturers, from having any access to a vehicle’s CAN bus data, without the vehicle manufacturer’s prior consent.

    Now, in that context, wouldn’t it be convenient if the vehicle manufacturers jumped upon the reports of the hackers’ abilities to put lives at risk, so as to justify the encryption of vehicle networks? Conspiracy theory? Maybe. I am susceptible. I once imagined that the large discrepancy between real-world and quoted fuel efficiency figures could have been indicative of an OE-level distortion of engine test results…


    Further tech info
    http://automotiveanalytics.net/agile-diagnostics




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